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EQUAL PROTECTION AND PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING:
SERRANO v. PRIEST'
The Baldwin Park Unified School District expended $577.49 to educate each of its public school children in the 1968-69 school year.2
During the same period the Beverly Hills Unified School District spent
$1,231.72 per child. 3 On August 30, 1971 the California Supreme
Court in Serrano v. Priest' ruled that the public school financing system which allows such a disparity in educational disbursements invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality of a
child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors. 5 Recognizing that the right to an education in our public schools
is a fundamental interest which cannot be conditioned upon wealth,
the court was unable to discern any compelling state purpose necessitating the present method of financing and therefore concluded that
such a system violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.0
1. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), modified, 5 Cal. 3d
884a (Advance sheet Nov. 9, 1971).
2. CAL. DEPT. OF EDUC., CAL. PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SELECTED STATISTICS 1968-69, at
90-91 (1970).
3. Id.
4. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). Justice McComb entered a lone dissent.
5. Id. at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
6. Id. Accord, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., - F. Supp. (W.D. Tex. 1971) (Texas school financing system based on local property taxes is
unconstitutional in that it discriminates on the basis of wealth, denies to plaintiffs a
fundamental interest in education, and is not supported by a compelling state interest);
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971) (Minnesota school financing system unconstitutional on same grounds).
The plaintiffs' complaint in Serrano also alleged that the financing system violates
article I, sections 11 and 21 of the California Constitution. Section 11 provides: "All
laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation." Section 21 states:
No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be
altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of
citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not
be granted to all citizens.
Since the California Supreme Court has construed these provisions as "substantially the
equivalent" of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution (Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d
321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965)), the court's analysis of the plaintiffs' federal equal protection contention is also applicable to their claim under the state constitutional provi-
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The plaintiffs, Los Angeles County public school children7 and their
parents,8 set forth three causes of action in their complaint against
the state9 and county10 officials charged with administering and financing the California public school system. They alleged in substance

that: (1) as a direct result of the financing scheme, educational opportunities made available to children attending public schools in certain districts were substantially inferior to educational opportunities
made available to children in other districts; (2) the financing scheme
caused parents in certain districts to pay at a higher tax rate than taxpayers'" in other school districts while obtaining the same or lesser edusions. 5 Cal. 3d at 596 n.11, 487 P.2d at 1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 n.11. See
text accompanying notes 161-67 infra.
Because of the confusion regarding the California Supreme Court's initial decision,
a modification opinion was entered on October 21, 1971. 5 Cal. 3d 884a (Advance
sheet Nov. 9, 1971). Although in the initial decision the supreme court merely
reviewed and reversed the dismissal of the complaint entered after the trial court
sustained the general demurrers filed by the defendants, it appears that as a result
some persons were paying property taxes under protest and filing for refunds. L.A.
Times, Oct. 22, 1971, part 1, at 1, col. 3. The protesters were not entirely unjustified
in their belief that the initial decision disposed of the case on its merits. See 5 Cal.
3d at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604: "We have determined that this
funding scheme invidiously discriminates against the poor. . . ." However, the court
clarified in its modification opinion that (1) the initial decision was not final and on
the merits; (2) the initial decision determined plaintiffs' allegations to be legally sufficient and thus remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings; (3) should
the trial court find the present system unconstitutional (what else could it do in light
of the strong language of the initial decision?) it could provide for enforcement
through orderly transition; and (4) a judgment that the present system is unconstitutional need not be retroactive, and the present plan should remain operable until an
appropriate new plan can be put into effect. 5 Cal. 3d 884a (Advance sheet Nov. 9,
1971).
7. The plaintiff children claimed to represent a class consisting of all public school
pupils in California "except children in that school district, the identity of which is
presently unknown, which school district affords the greatest educational opportunity
of all school districts within California." 5 Cal. 3d at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 604.
8. The plaintiff parents claimed to represent a class of all parents who have children
in the school system and who pay real property taxes in the county of their residence.

Id.
9. The state officials are the Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction and the
Controller of the State of California. Id.
10. The county officials are the Tax Collector and Treasurer, and the Superintendent
of Schools of the County of Los Angeles. These officials are sued both in their local
capacities and as representatives of a class composed of the school superintendent, tax
collector and treasurer of each of the other counties of the state. id.
11. The parents brought suit under section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure:
An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a
county, town, city or city and county of the state, may be maintained against any
officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf, either by a
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cational opportunities; and (3) an actual controversy had arisen and
existed between the parties.' 2 The trial court sustained general demurrers filed by the defendants and after a review and affirmance in

the court of appeal"3 the California Supreme Court granted a hearing.
Fundamental to an analysis of the constitutional problems presented
in Serrano is an understanding of the California public school financing

system. The California Constitution directs the legislature to provide
for a system of common schools14 and the levying of local taxes to con-

tribute support for those schools.' 5

As a result, local property taxes

supplemented by aid from the State School Fund provide over 90 percent of the state school financing. 6

The actual revenue which a local district can raise is the product
of two factors: (1) the assessed valuation of property within its borders,
and (2) the rate of taxation within the district. 17 The assessed valuation
within a school district varies widely and is totally beyond the control
of the residents of that district.' 8 - Thus, in 1969-70 the assessed
citizen resident therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to
pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax
therein. This section does not affect any right of action in favor of a county,
city, town, or city and county, or any public officer; provided, that no injunction
shall be granted restraining the offering for sale, sale or issuance of any municipal
bonds for public improvements or public utilities.
In Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971), the
California Supreme Court ruled taxpayers qua taxpayers have sufficient standing to
seek injunctive relief to restrain public officers from expending their own time and the
time of other officials in carrying out the provisions of an unconstitutional law. The
Serrano court agreed that the plaintiff parents had sufficient standing to state a cause of
action. 5 Cal. 3d at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265-66, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26.
12. Plaintiffs prayed for: (1) a declaration that the present financing system is
unconstitutional; (2) an order directing defendants to reallocate school funds in order
to remedy this invalidity; and (3) an adjudication that the trial court retain jurisdiction
of the action so that it may restructure the system if defendants and the state legislature
fail to act within a reasonable time. 5 Cal. 3d at 591, 487 P.2d at 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
605.
13. 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970).
14. The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by which a
free school shall be kept up and supported in each district at least six months in
every year, after the first year in which a school has been established. CAL.
CONST. art. IX, § 5.
15. The Legislature shall provide for the levying annually by the governing body
of each county, and city and county, of such school district taxes, at rates not in
excess of the maximum rates of school district tax fixed or authorized by the
Legislature, as will produce in each fiscal year such revenue for each school
district as the governing board thereof shall determine is required in such fiscal
year for the support of all schools and functions of said district authorized or
required by law. Id. § 6.
16. 1 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE, EXPENDITURES FOR EDUCATION 5 (1971).
17. 5 Cal. 3d at 592, 487 P.2d at 1246, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
18. Id.
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valuation per unit of average daily attendance 9 of elementary school
children ranged from a low of $103 to a high of $952,156.20 The rate
of taxation in a particular district is limited by statute"' although a
majority of the district's voters may decide in a tax override election 22
to surpass the maximum. Therefore, the revenue raised in a given
school district is flexible only to the extent that the voters in that
district are willing and able to tax themselves for education.
The school funds which a district raises by local taxation are supplemented by the state from the State School Fund pursuant to the
"foundation program.""
This is accomplished through at least one
of several methods. Each district, regardless of its wealth and taxing
power, receives $125 per year for each school child in the form of
"basic state aid." 4 Since, by statute, a school district must receive
from combined local and state funds at least $355 per elementary
school pupil25 and $488 per high school student,2 6 the state is under an
obligation to further contribute to those districts which cannot reach
19. Most determinations of school aid are not based on total enrollment, but on
"average daily attendance," a figure computed by compiling the number of students actually present on each school day and dividing that by the total days school was
taught. CAL. EDuc. CODE ANN. §§ 11252, 11301, 11401 (West 1969). Average
daily attendance approximates 98 percent of total enrollment. 4 LEGsLATiE ANALYST,
PUBLIC

SCHOOL FINANCE,

GLOSSARY

OF

TERMs

MOST

OFTEN

USED

IN

SCHOOL

FINANCE 2 (1971). Hereinafter, any reference to "per pupil" or "per child" means
per unit of average daily attendance. 5 Cal. 3d at 592 n.4, 487 P.2d at 1246 n.4,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 606 n.4.
20. 5 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE, CURRENT ISSUES IN EDUCATIONAL FINANCE 7 (1971).

21. CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 20751 (West 1969).
22. Id. § 20803.
23. The system of public school support should effect a partnership between the
State, the county, and the local district, with each participating equitably in accordance with its relative ability. The respective abilities should be combined to
provide a financial plan between the State and the local agencies known as the
foundation program for public school support. Toward this foundation program,
each county and district, through a uniform method should contribute in accordance with its true financial ability. Id. § 17300.
24. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall allow one hundred twenty-five
dollars ($125) to each elementary school district for each unit of average daily
attendance therein during the fiscal year . . . but not less than two thousand four
hundred dollars ($2,400) shall be allowed to any elementary school district, to be
known as basic state aid. Id. § 17751.
The same provision is made for high school districts. Id. § 17801.
25. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall compute an amount determined
by multiplying the total average daily attendance, exclusive of pupils attending the
seventh and eighth grades of a junior high school, by $355. This is the foundation
program for elementary districts. Id. § 17656 (West Supp. 1971). The same amount
is credited to the elementary school district for each pupil in the seventh and eighth
grades. Id. § 17660 (West Supp. 1971).
26. For each high school district which has an average daily attendance of 301
or more during the fiscal year, [the Superintendent of Public Instruction] shall
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the required minimum expenditure when the basic grant is added to
their local taxing effort. This additional grant is known as "equalization aid."' 27 The state, however, does not apply the actual local tax con-

tribution for purposes of determining the amount of a district's equalization aid. 28

To do so would reward a school district for reducing its

own contribution from local taxes since equalization aid is theoretically the difference between the statutory minimum and the combination of local taxes and basic aid. Instead, the state computes equalization aid by determining how much local tax revenue would be raised at
a hypothetical local tax rate of one dollar on each $100 of assessed

valuation in elementary school districts and eighty cents per $100 in
high school districts.2" To that figure is added the $125 basic aid grant
and if the sum is less than the statutory minimum, the gap is closed by
equalization aid funds.8 0 In this way, while basic aid is a flat rate,

equalization aid is contributed by the state in inverse proportion to the
wealth of the district.
In addition to basic state aid and equalization aid, extremely poor

districts who are willing to make an extra local tax effort may receive a further state subsidy in the form of "supplemental aid."8

1

Despite the disproportionate state subsidies, however, great disparities
continue to exist between wealthy school districts like Beverly Hills and
multiply the average daily attendance by four hundred eighty-eight dollars ($488).
Id. § 17665 (West Supp. 1971).
27. If the total amount allowed to, and computed for, any elementary school district pursuant to Section 17751 . . . [see note 24 supra] . . . is less than the
amount of the foundation program of school support computed for such district
pursuant to Sections 17651 to 17680, inclusive [see notes 25-26 supra] [the Superintendent of Public Instruction] shall add to the amount computed for such district
pursuant to Section 17751 . . . such additional amount, to be known as state
equalization aid, as may be necessary to equal that computed for such district
pursuant to Sections 17651 to 17680. CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 17901 (West
1969).
Basically the same provision is made for high school districts. Id. § 17902.
28. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall compute for each district described herein ... the amount, to be known as district aid, which a tax levied on
each one hundred dollars ($100) of 100 percent of the assessed valuation in such
district as shown by the equalized assessment roll of the district for the current
year would produce if levied, if such tax was:
(a) One dollar ($1) in an elementary school district.
(b) Eighty cents ($0.80) in a high school district.
(c) Twenty-five cents ($0.25) in a junior college district. Id. § 17702.
29. Id.
30. See note 27 supra.
31. Under this program an elementary district having an assessed valuation below
$12,500 per pupil may receive up to an additional $125 per child. A high school
district having an assessed valuation less than $24,500 per pupil may receive up to $72
in supplemental aid. In either instance, the district must set its local tax rate sufficiently high. CAL. EDc. CoDg ANN, § 17920-26 (West 1969).
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poorer districts like Baldwin Park. 32 In short, the state effort is not
sufficient to eliminate substantial differences in the ability of school districts to collect taxes based upon the assessed valuation of real property
within its borders.3 3
In addition to their argument that the financing scheme fails to provide the poor with equal protection of the law as required by both the
federal and state34 constitutions, the plaintiffs in Serrano attacked the
system as violating article IX, section 5 of the California Constitution
which states: "The Legislature shall provide for a system of common
schools by which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each
district at least six months in every year. . . ." The present method of
school financing, according to the plaintiffs, produces separate and distinct systems, each offering varying educational opportunities depending
upon the financial resources of the district. The court rejected this argument, relying upon their earlier decision that "common" meant only
uniform in terms of prescribed courses of study and educational progression from grade to grade. Thus, the provision does not require
32. For example, in the school year 1968-69 the Baldwin Park Unified School
District spent $577.49 to educate each school child; the Pasadena Unified School Dis
trict spent $840.19 per student; and the Beverly Hills Unified School District expended
$1,231.72 per child. CAL. DEPT. OF EDUC., CAL. PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SELECTED STATISTICS
1968-69, at 90-91 (1970).
33. An example may be helpful in demonstrating the basic pattern of the school
financing scheme. Assume an elementary school district with 10,000 elementary
school children, a total real property assessed valuation of $100 million within its
borders, and a tax rate of $0.75 per $100 of assessed valuation. Determination of
the amount of equalization aid for this hypothetical school district is as follows:
(1) The state disregards the actual tax rate of $0.75 per $100 of assessed valuation
and computes the .amount of revenue, which the district would collect if it taxed real
property at a rate of one dollar per $100 of assessed valuation. In this example:
$100,000,000/$100 X $1 = $1,000,000
(2) The local contribution per child is computed. In this example:
$1,000,000/10,000 children = $100/child
(3) To that figure is added the flat basic aid grant of $125 per child.' In this
example:
$100 + $125 = $225
(4) The equalization aid contribution is computed by subtracting the above step 3
figure from the foundation minimum of $355 per child for elementary school districts.
In this example:
$355 -

$225 =

$130

(5) The state is then under an obligation to contribute a total of $255 per child
to the district: $125 per child as basic state aid and $130 per child as equalization aid.
Any supplemental aid is in addition to this amount. Thus, while all districts will
spend a minimum of $355 per elementary child, wealthy districts are able to expend
far more this amount.
34. See note 6 supra.
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equal spending. 5 An interpretation of section 5 as a mandate for
equal spending would create a conflict with section 630 of the same
article which specifically authorizes the element of the fiscal system of
which the plaintiffs complained. Noting that principles of construction
dictate that where constitutional provisions can reasonably be construed
to avoid a conflict, such an interpretation should be adopted,1 7 the court
ruled that section 5 could not bear the plaintiffs' interpretation."" Having disposed of preliminary matters, the court proceeded to an analysis of the plaintiffs' constitutional attack on the financing scheme.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
undergone a rapid and dramatic transformation over the last several
years, its role changing from an instrument of minimal judicial intervention to that of a far reaching tool for the protection of fundamental
rights not expressly specified in the Constitution. 9 The "traditional"
application of equal protection is demonstrated in McGowan v. Maryland4" where the United States Supreme Court declared Sunday closing
laws to be consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Chief Justice
Warren declared that states are allowed a wide discretion in enacting
legislation which affects some groups of citizens differently than others
and a state would be presumed to have acted within its constitutional
power despite the fact that its laws resulted in some inequality. 41 To
overcome this presumption it must be shown that no rational relationship
existed between the state's objectives and the means employed for
reaching those objectives.4 2 It was this "traditional" test which the
California court of appeal applied to determine whether the instant
school financing scheme was not unconstitutional. Citing Mclnnis v.
35. 5 Cal. 3d at 596, 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609, citing Piper v. Big
Pine School District, 193 Cal. 664, 669, 673, 226 P. 926, 928, 930 (1924).
36. See note 15 supra.
37. Even if the court were to adopt plaintiffs' construction, there would then be an
irreconcilable conflict with section 6; and since section 6 was adopted more recently, it
would prevail. 5 Cal. 3d at 596, 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609, citing People
v. Western Airlines, Inc., 42 Cal. 2d 621, 637, 268 P.2d 723, 732 (1954) and County
of Placer v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 182, 189, 323 P.2d 753, 757 (1958).
38. 5 Cal. 3d at 596, 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
39. E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) [for discussion see text accompanying notes 66-67 infra]; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) [see text accompanying note 65 infra]; Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) [see note 61 infra];
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) [for discussion see text accompanying notes 60-64

infra].
40. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
41. Id. at 425-26.
42. Id.
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Shapiro,43 wherein a three-judge federal district court ruled that a

similar Illinois public school financing plan did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause, Justice Dunn speaking on behalf of the court of

appeal said:
The court determined in Mclnnis that the school financing legislation
did not violate the equal protection clause, because variations in the
amount of money spent per pupil are reasonably related to the legislative policy of delegating authority to school districts,t 44] including the
right to determine their own tax burden according to the importance
which they place upon public schools. 45
Since a rational relationship can be found between the objective and

the means, the traditional test would not support the Serrano plaintiffs'
contentions that they had been denied the equal protection of the law.
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has adopted a more

stringent test by which to measure equal protection in cases involving

"suspect classifications"'4 6 or "fundamental interests. '47 In such instances it is not enough that the statute be rationally related to the
state's objective; instead, the state bears the burden of establishing not
only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law4" but also,
in California at least, that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose.49 It is this standard, the plaintiffs claimed,

by which the public school financing scheme must be measured.
Racial classifications have long been considered "suspect" in light of
43. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill.), af'd mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.
322 (1969).
44. A like policy is expressed by the California Legislature. "The system of public
school support should be designed to strengthen and encourage local responsibility for
control of public education." CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 17300 (West 1969).
45. 89 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
46. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) [for discussion see text accompanying
notes 57-58 infra]; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) [for discussion see text accompanying notes 60-64 infra]; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
[for discussion see text accompanying notes 54-56 infra].
47. E.g., Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) [for discussion see
text accompanying note 90 infra]; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964)
[for discussion see text accompanying notes 88-89 infra]; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) [for discussion see text accompanying notes 85-87 infra].
48. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
49. Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970),
vacated and remanded, 403 U.S. 915 (1971) (to be reconsidered in light of Gordon v.
Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971), holding that West Virginia's requirement for a 60%
majority referendum does not violate the Equal Protection Clause). There, the
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the Fourteenth Amendment.5 ° The elimination of racial discrimination
was one of the primary purposes of that Amendment and the unconstitutionality of classifications drawn upon racial lines has been a continuously voiced theme in equal protection doctrine.51 The United
States Supreme Court enunciated the basic objective of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1873, eight years after its passage:
[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found
[in the Fourteenth Amendment] .

. .

.

[W]e mean the freedom of

the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom,
and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over
hiMn52

In 1880, the Court struck down an obviously discriminatory West Virginia statute which prohibited Negroes from serving on juries, declaring:
[The Fourteenth Amendment] was designed to assure to the colored
race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by
white persons, and to give to that race the protection of the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the States.
53

In Korematsu v. United States," the Court noted the special treatment
given to cases involving racial issues and stated that
California Supreme Court held that requiring a local bond issue to be approved by
a two-thirds majority vote violated the Equal Protection Clause. Such a requirement would be valid only if "it can be shown necessary to promote a compelling
state interest." Id. at 787, 471 P.2d at 502, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 854 (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) [for discussion see
text accompanying notes 54-56 infra]; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) [for discussion see text accompanying note 57 infra].
51. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
52. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873). The Court upheld a
Louisiana law which chartered a corporation and granted to it a 25 year monopoly to
maintain slaughterhouses. While deciding the law did not deprive citizens of equal
protection, the Court discussed at length the purpose of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
53. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879). The petitioner had sought
to remove his state prosecution to a federal court because the West Virginia law prohibited Negroes from serving on juries. The Court ruled that persons cannot be excluded from a jury solely because of their race.
54. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The petitioner, an American citizen, was convicted in a
federal district court for remaining in San Leandro, California, a "Military Area"
during World War II, contrary to an order that all persons of Japanese ancestry
should be excluded from that area.
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all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny.55
In Korematsu, the restrictions based -upon Japanese ancestry withstood
the "rigid scrutiny" because of the government's compelling interest in
segregating persons of Japanese descent during a time of war, when invasion by the Japanese Empire was feared to be imminent. 56 The "suspect" nature of cases involving racial discrimination is made clear in
Loving v. Virginia,57 a recent case in which a statute prohibiting interracial marriage was ruled unconstitutional. After pointing out that this
was not a case involving mere economic regulation, the Court noted:
In the case at bar
we deal with statutes containing racial classifications, and the fact of equal application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth
Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according
58
to race.
By virtue of the fact that the very raison d'tre of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate unequal treatment of the races under the law,
the "suspect" nature of statutes which seek to impose liabilities or
deprive an individual of rights solely because of his race have been continually recognized by the courts.
Race, however, has not been the only classification regarded as suspect by the courts in their determination of equal protection questions.
As Justice Sullivan noted in Serrano: "One factor which has repeatedly
come under close scrutiny of the high court is wealth." 59 The application of this doctrine is seen in Griffin v. Illinois" where a state law requiring defendants in criminal matters to pay a fee for a complete trial
transcript 1 was declared invalid. Without the transcript it was impossible for defendants to obtain complete appellate review of their cases.
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the Illinois statute created
two classifications of defendants: (1) those who could afford to pay
the fine and thus obtain a copy of their trial transcript, and (2) those
55. Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 223-24.
57. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
58. Id. at 9.
59. 5 Cal. 3d at 597, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
60. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
61. In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) the same result was reached with regard
to an Ohio law requiring the paying of a docket fee. The Court relied extensively on its
prior decision in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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who could not afford to pay the fee and thus were barred from receiving a copy of the trial record. 62 The Court concluded that once a
state decides to provide for a system of appellate review,0 3 it cannot
establish a procedure which has the effect of precluding certain individuals simply because of their economic circumstances. 4 In 1961
this principle was extended to required fees for the filing of habeas corpus petitions. 5
Thus far the Court had scrutinized classifications drawn -upon wealth
only as the result of an actively imposed statute that required the payment of a fee, without which the criminal defendant was unable to pursue
his procedural rights. But in Douglas v. California0 the state was placed
under an obligation to provide legal counsel for indigent defendants on
appeal. In Douglas, there existed no legislatively imposed requirement for fees that tended to classify defendants by their economic status.
Rather, there merely existed the fact of poverty and the resulting inability of defendants to effectively assert their rights. Speaking for the
Court, Justice Douglas concluded:
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling
of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a
preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to
67
shift for himself.
Justice Harlan, who had previously dissented in Griffin v. Illinois,8
protested the Court's mandate that a state actively eliminate differences
in the economic plight of criminal defendants:
Laws such as these do not deny equal protection to the less fortunate
62. 351 U.S. at 17-19.
63. Id. at 18-19.
64. Justice Burton and Justice Minton, with whom Justice Reed and Justice Harlan
joined, dissented:
The court finds in the operation of these requirements . . . an invidious classification between the "rich" and the "poor." But no economic burden attendant upon
the exercise of a privilege bears equally upon all, and in other circumstances the
resulting differentiation is not treated as invidious classification by the State, even
though discrimination against "indigents" by name would be unconstitutional.
Thus, while the exclusion of "indigents" from a free state university would deny
them equal protection, requiring the payment of tuition fees surely would not,
despite the resulting exclusion of those who could not afford to pay the fees.
And if imposing a condition of payment is not the equivalent of a classification
by the State in one case, I fail to see why it would be so regarded in another.
Id. at 35.
65. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
66. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
67. Id. at 357-58.
68. See note 64 supra.
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for one essential reason: the Equal Protection Clause does not impose
on the States "an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from dif69
ferences in economic circumstances."
There were other methods, however, by which a state might classify
its citizens according to wealth. Many states made certain crimes pun-

ishable by both imprisonment and fine.

State sentencing provisions

provided that if the convicted criminal could not pay the fines, his period of confinement would be continued for a length of time to be determined by some conversion of unpaid dollars to days served in
prison.7 ° In Williams v. Illinois7 ' the Supreme Court ruled that such
imprisonment provisions created two classes of imprisoned criminals
solely on the basis of their ability to pay the fine. Since the class unable
to pay the fine was incarcerated for a longer period than those whose
financial status allowed payment, indigent violators were denied equal

protection of the law.72
It is noteworthy that in each of these instances there was no doubt

concerning the state's ability to show a rational relationship between
the statute or policy involved and the state's objective. Mandatory
filing fees are rationally related to a state's objective of providing

revenue to meet the cost of handling the documents involved in a criminal appeal. 73 A policy of not providing indigent defendants with legal

counsel on appeal rationally relates to the state's objective of conserving
its resources. 74 And a law requiring defendants to work off fines in
69. 372 U.S. at 362. Justice Stewart joined in the dissent.
70. For example, section 1-7(k) of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 provides:
Working out fines. A judgment of a fine imposed upon an offender may be
enforced in the same manner as a judgment entered in a civil action; Provided,
however, that in such judgment imposing the fine the court may further order that
upon non-payment of such fine, the offender may be imprisoned until the fine is
paid, or satisfied at the rate of $5.00 per day of imprisonment; Provided, further,
however, that no person shall be imprisoned under the first provision hereof for a
longer period than 6 months.
71. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
72. Id. at 242. In Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), this principle was extended
to offenses punishable by fine only. The petitioner was unable to pay fines of $425
accumulated on nine convictions for traffic offenses. The court, which otherwise had
no authority to impose prison sentences, confined the petitioner under TEx. CoDE Casm.
PROC., art. 45.53 (1966) which allowed a defendant to be incarcerated at the rate of
one day in jail for each $5 of fine owed The United States Supreme Court struck
down the statute, relying on its decision in Williams. 401 U.S. at 397.
73. "[I]f
a transcript is used, it is surely not unreasonable to require the appellant to
bear its cost. . . ." 351 U.S. at 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
74. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969). The Court recognized
"that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs."
In Shapiro the Court was reviewing welfare payments. For discussion of Shapiro see
notes 92-96 infra and accompanying text.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

prison serves the state's policy of deterring violation of its criminal
statutes. 7" But in each case, despite the rational relationship, the defendants were found to have been denied the equal protection of the law.
The Serrano plaintiffs contended that the California public school
financing scheme classifies on the basis of wealth. This argument was
advanced in order to taint the financing scheme by characterizing it as a
system based upon a suspect classification, and therefore require it to
be measured by the stricter "compelling state interest" test rather than
by the "rational relationship" equal protection test. If the state were
merely required to show that a rational relationship existed between its
financing plan and its declared policy7" of allowing local districts to determine their own level of school spending, plaintiffs were destined
for failure. 77 On the other hand, the public officials would have an
insurmountable task establishing a compelling state interest for maintaining the present system.7 s Realizing this, the defendants' efforts were
not directed toward establishing such an interest, rather, their defense
was more fundamental to the issue-they disputed the proposition that
the financing scheme discriminated on the basis of wealth at all.71
First, the defendants argued, since through basic state aid funds are
distributed equally to all pupils, and equalization aid is distributed in a
manner beneficial to poor districts, the scheme does not discriminate
against poorer districts.80 The court rejected this argument, however,
noting that while state contributions partially alleviated the disparities
in local revenue, the system taken as a whole discriminates because it
generates revenue in proportion to the unequal wealth of the district.81
Second, the defendants asserted that the only proper index of a district's
wealth is the total assessed valuation of its property. The court dismissed this argument by noting that "the only meaningful measure of a
district's wealth in the present context is not the absolute value of its
property, but the ratio of its resources to its pupils.
,,sz The de75. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. at 241:
A State has wide latitude in fixing the punishment for state crimes. Thus,
appellant does not assert that Illinois could not have appropriately fixed the
penalty, in the first instance, at one year and 101 days. Nor has the claim been
advanced that the sentence imposed was excessive in light of the circumstances
of the commission of this particular offense.
76. See note 44 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
78. See text accompanying notes 102-110 infra.
79. 5 Cal. 3d at 598, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 599, 487 P.2d at 1251, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11.
82. Defendants argued that assessed valuation per child is not reliable as an index of
wepdth of a district becaiise a district with a low total assessed valuation but a very
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fendants also argued that the wealth of a school district does not necessarily reflect the wealth of the families who live there. The court rejected this argument, declaring: "We think that discrimination on the
basis of district wealth is equally invalid [as discrimination on the basis
of individual wealth]." ' 3 In short, the court responded affirmatively
to the plaintiffs' contention that the school financing system classifies
on the basis of wealth: "We find this proposition irrefutable."8 4
Classifications based on suspect criteria are not the only factual
situations which require extraordinary scrutiny by the judiciary; even if
the classification is not inherently suspect, it may deprive certain individuals of prerogatives that are so basic in nature as to be considered
"fundamental" rights. If this is the case, the burden is again on the
state to show that it has a compelling interest which would be jeopardized if it were not for the classification.
This doctrine began to emerge in Skinner v. Oklahoma 8 where an
"habitual criminal" protested a state law allowing his sexual sterilization. 0 After first noting that the case touched "a sensitive and important
area of human rights," Justice Douglas warned:
[S]trict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization
law is essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations
are made against groups or types of individuals in violation of the cons
stitutional guaranty of just and equal laws. 7
Twenty-two years later in Reynolds v. Sims ss the constitutionality of
state voting apportionment plans was at issue. Despite the absence of
small number of students will have a high per pupil base and appear "wealthy."
Expenditure per pupil is untrustworthy because that figure is partly determined by the
district's tax rate which can be varied by the taxpayers. Thus, a district with a high
total assessed valuation might levy a low tax and end up spending the same amount
per pupil as a poorer district which had decided to tax itself at a higher rate. To this
argument the court responded that this merely points out how a richer district is favored
because it can provide better education for its children with less tax effort. Id. at 599,
487 P.2d at 1251, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
83. Id. at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612. The court also said that
a correlation between individual wealth and district wealth was a material fact to
be treated as admitted by the demurrers. Id. at 600-01, 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 612.
84. Id. at 598, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
85. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
86. Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act allowed sterilization of those
criminals who, having been convicted two or more times of felonies involving moral
turpitude, were thereafter convicted of such a felony. Ch. 26 art. 1, [1935] Okla. Laws
94.
87. 316 U.S. at 541.

88. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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suspect criteria, the Court subjected the state plans to unusual scrutiny8 9 because of the impairment of the fundamental right to vote.
This same right is affected when the state attempts to make payment of
a poll tax a prerequisite to its exercise. Such a tax wag declared unconstitutional in Harper v. Board of Elections ° where the Court's policy with regard to potential denial of basic fundamental rights was expressed:
We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties

are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which
might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully
confined. 9 1

In Shapiro v. Thompson 2 the fundamental interest doctrine was applied to invalidate state laws requiring a specified residency period before an individual could be eligible to receive welfare payments. The
effect of such statutes was to create two classes of persons, indistinguishable from each other except in regard to the length of time they had been
residents of the state. 93 Since needy families could not move to such a
state without placing themselves in a situation where they would have no
means of support, their constitutional right to interstate travel94 was
restricted.9 5 Having linked the restrictive statute to a fundamental interest, the Court ruled that, in the absence of compelling governmental
89. [N]either history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are
permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation. Id. at 579-80.
90. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
91. Id. at 670.
92. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
93. See text accompanying note 139 infra.
94. Although the right to travel has not been traced to any specific constitutional
provision, it has been treated as a constitutional right by the Court. In Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116 (1958), where the Court held that the Secretary of State could not constitutionally promulgate regulations denying passports to certain "subversive" individuals,
Justice Douglas said: "The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen
cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment." 357 U.S.
at 125. In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), the Court decided
that section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 785
(1964), which prohibited members of the Communist Party from applying for a
passport, encroached upon the right to travel. And in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966), where the Court concluded that a conspiracy to deprive Negroes of the
right to travel from state to state was reviewable under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3731 (1970), Justice Stewart stated:
Although there have been recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as
to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel. . . . All have agreed
that the right exists. 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966).
95. 394 U.S. 618, 631-32 (1969).
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interests, such a law is unconstitutional because of its denial of equal
protection.90
With the developing fundamental interest doctrine in mind the Serrano plaintiffs alleged that the school financing scheme infringed upon a
fundamental interest, namely education.9 7 If education could be established as a fundamental right, the way would then be cleared for invocation of the compelling interest requirement. In fact, the California

court of appeal refused to accept the argument that education could
be compared to such basic rights as interstate travel and voting.9 The
California Supreme Court, however, agreed with the plaintiffs, noting
that in today's society education plays such an indispensable role that
it must be considered fundamental in nature. Quoting excerpts from a

broad spectrum of sources99 extolling the value of education, 10 Justice
Sullivan concluded: "We are convinced that the distinctive and price-

less function of education in our society warrants, indeed compels, our
treating it as a fundamental interest."" '
96. Id. at 634.
97. 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
98. 89 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
99. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954):
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
The court also referred to excerpts from Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (prohibiting Bible readings in public schools); McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (prohibiting religious education in public schools);
Manjares v. Newton, 64 Cal. 2d 365, 411 P.2d 901, 49 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1966) (compelling a school district to furnish bus service where the refusal to furnish such service
resulted in a denial of the opportunity to attend school); San Francisco Unified
School Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 482 P.2d 878, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1971)
(where the court considered a claim that school districts had been gerrymandered to
avoid integration); Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., 193 Cal. 664, 226 P. 926 (1924)
(upholding the right of an Indian girl to attend state public schools).
100. The defendants argued that these "education" cases are not of precedential value
because they do not consider education in the context of wealth discrimination, but
rather in the context of racial segregation or total exclusion from school. To this the
court replied: "Our quotation of these cases is not intended to suggest that they control
the legal result which we reach here, but simply that they eloquently express the crucial
importance of education." 5 Cal. 3d at 605-06 n.23, 487 P.2d at 1256 n.23, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 616 n.23.
101. Id. at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618 (footnote omitted).
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Having found both a suspect classification in the form of wealth and
a fundamental interest in education, the court concluded that the justifying interest asserted by the state did not compel the continuance of the
present scheme.'0 2 The compelling state interest which the defendants
advanced in support of the current system was California's policy "to
strengthen and encourage local responsibility for control of public
education."' 10 The court felt that this interest of local control embodied
two aspects which should be considered separately: (1) local responsibility for control of the administrative affairs of public schools, and
(2) local choice of, and responsibility for, the financial needs of public
education. 0 4 First, the court acknowledged the propriety of vesting in
the local districts control of the administrative decision-making powers.
The court recognized that the individual district may be in the best
position to make many detailed decisions such as whom to hire and how
10
to schedule its educational offerings.
But even assuming arguendo that local administrative control may be a
compelling state interest, the present financial system cannot be considered necessary to further this interest. No matter how the state decides
to finance its system of public education, it can still leave this decisionmaking power in the hands of the local districts. 10 6
Second, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether local free
choice in determining the amount of a district's educational expenditures
was a compelling state interest since "under the present financing system, such fiscal freewill is a cruel illusion for the poor school districts.' ' 10 7
If it is assumed that a more accurate reflection of a community's commitment to education is the rate at which citizens are willing to tax themselves for public education, 0 8 then, since Baldwin Park spends less than
102. Id. at 610-11, 487 P.2d at 1259-60, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.
103. See note 44 supra.
104. 5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
105. Id.
106. Id. See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable
Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. RPv. 305 (1969)
wherein the authors suggest six possible school financing systems which do not discriminate on the basis of wealth but which do allow subsidiarity in the administration of
the school system. These include: centralized state financing to districts on an equal
per pupil basis with districts (1) free to allocate to all reasonable uses, or (2) compelled to spend on an equal per pupil basis, or (3) compelled to allocate to various
categorical uses; allocation to districts on a reasonable basis other than per pupil thus
allowing categorical special aid for (4) the blind, gifted and disadvantaged and (5)
curricular specialization to be chosen by the district; or (6) direct aid to students
(rather than to districts). Id. at 398-99.
107. 5 Cal. 3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
108. Id.
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$600 per child and Beverly Hills spends over $1200 per child,
Baldwin Park should be deemed far more devoted to learning than
Beverly Hills, for Baldwin Park citizens levied a school tax of well
over $5 per $100 of assessed valuation, while residents of Beverly Hills
paid only slightly more than $2.109

Hence, since assessed valuation within a district is a major determinant
of how much money can be spent for schools, the present financing

scheme actually deprives less wealthy districts of local fiscal choice. 110
The Serrano decision manifestly extends the compelling state interest
test beyond its previously established limits. However, the precise
boundaries of this extension remain undefined. Does the compelling
interest test as set down by the United States Supreme Court merely
109. Id.
110. Id. Relying upon Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954) (upholding a
Maryland statute which allowed illegally seized evidence to be admitted in gambling
prosecutions in one county while barring use of such evidence elsewhere in the state)
and Board of Educ. v. Watson, 63 Cal. 2d 829, 409 P.2d 481, 48 Cal. Rptr. 481
(1966) (rejecting a constitutional attack on a statute which required special duties of
the tax assessor in counties with a population in excess of four million even though
only Los Angeles County would be affected), the defendants argued that territorial
uniformity in respect to the present financing system is not constitutionally required.
5 Cal. 3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620. The court noted that when
Salsburg was decided the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments had not yet been
interpreted to exclude unlawfully procured evidence in state trials and thus the
Maryland statute was treated as being only a procedural rule of evidence. Id. at
612 n.28, 487 P.2d at 1261 n.28, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 621 n.28. Thus, in both cases the
courts simply applied the traditional equal protection test and sustained the provisions
after finding some rational basis for the geographic classification. Id. The Serrano
court rejected the defendants' geographic argument, relying on two lines of recent
decisions indicating that where fundamental rights or suspect classifications are at issue,
a state's general freedom to discriminate on a geographical basis is significantly curtailed by the Equal Protection Clause.
The first line of decisions was comprised of "school closing" cases, typified by
Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) where the Court invalidated the state's
effort to close schools in only one part of the state when continued segregation was
the objective. The Court concluded in Griffin: "Whatever nonracial grounds might
support a State's allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must be a
" Id. at 231.
constitutional one ....
The Serrano court also relied on the legislative apportionment cases, e.g., Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) [For discussion see text accompanying notes 88-89 supra],
reasoning that "if a voter's address may not determine the weight to which his ballot is
entitled, surely it should not determine the quality of his child's education." 5 Cal. 3d
at 613, 487 P.2d at 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
Even if territorial uniformity were not required by the Equal Protection Clause
with respect to the school financing system, it would appear that the California
Supreme Court would be free to interpret the California Constitution as imposing such a requirement. (See text accompanying notes 161-67 infra.) The Serrano
court did not specifically discuss this.
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require either a fundamental interest or a suspect classification? Is the
relationship between the two types of factual situations which will invoke the test disjunctive in nature; or is the test conjunctive, requiring

the presence of both a suspect class and the impairment of a fundamental interest? The language of the Court indicates that either situation alone is sufficient. For example, in McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners1 -' Chief Justice Warren stated:
[A] careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines
are drawn on the basis of wealth or race, ... two factors which would
independently render a classification highly suspect and thereby de2
mand a more exacting judicial scrutiny."1

Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion in Shapiro v. Thompson,"'
stated the rule as he understood the Shapiro majority's formulation:
[S]tatutory classifications which either are based upon certain "suspect" criteria or affect "fundamental rights" will be held to deny equal
4
protection unless justified by a "compelling" governmental interest."1
In Serrano, the California Supreme Court implies the same understanding." 85 The application of the doctrine where race is the suspect class

supports this interpretation. While many of the decisions invalidating
classifications drawn upon race also involved fundamental interests, 1 0
there has been no judicial hesitation to strike down such a classification even in the absence of an intrusion upon a fundamental interest. 1 7
But, as has been previously noted, "the Equal Protection Clause was

largely a product of the desire to eradicate legal distinction founded
111. 394 U.S. 802 (1969). The Court found it unnecessary to apply strict scrutiny
to an absentee ballot law because the provisions were not drawn on the basis of
wealth or race and the fundamental right to vote had not been impaired.
112. Id. at 807 (emphasis added), quoted in Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 597, 487 P.2d
at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
113. 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969).
114. Id. at 658 (emphasis added).
115. For example, the court states, "On the other hand, in cases involving 'suspect
classifications' or touching on 'fundamental interests', the court has . . .[subjected] the
classification to strict scrutiny." 5 Cal. 3d at 597, 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
609, quoting Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 784-85, 471 P.2d 487, 500, 87
Cal. Rptr. 839, 852 (1970), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 403 U.S. 915
(1971) (emphasis added). And later the court speaks of plaintiffs' "fundamental
interest" argument as an "additional dimension." Id. at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96
Cal. Rptr at 615.
116. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Marriage is one of the
'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival."); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
117. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (invalidating a criminal statute prohibiting cohabitation by interracial unmarried couples).
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upon race."1 18 Is a classification based on wealth as egregious as one
based upon race? If so, such a classification by itself, without the support of a fundamental interest, will require the close scrutiny of the
court. A second look at the cases involving suspect classifications based
upon wealth reveals, however, that such an interest has always been
involved when the court found a denial of equal protection. At times
the classifications denied fundamental criminal rights by creating a class
of defendants who, due to their economic condition, were unable to
afford certain requisites of a proper defense. 119 Fundamental criminal rights were also involved when sentencing provisions based upon
wealth were invalidated.'2 0 And the classification created by the requirement of a poll tax denies the constitutionally guaranteed fran2
chise. 1
The Serrano court recognized the distinction previously made between classifications based on race vis-h-vis those drawn on wealth:
"Until the present time wealth classifications have been invalidated only
in conjunction with a limited number of fundamental interests-rights
of defendants in criminal cases and voting rights."' 1 2 This recognition implies that the court now intends to invalidate classifications
based upon wealth even in the absence of a fundamental interest.
The implications of such a conclusion, particularly in light of the
court's recognition that past decisions have not necessarily involved
purposeful discrimination, but rather "'unintentional' classifications
whose impact simply fell more heavily on the poor,"'2 3 are far reaching
118. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
119. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708
(1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
120. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
121. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1971).
122. 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615 (emphasis added and
citations omitted).
123. The defendants argued that even if the financing system does classify by
wealth, there is no constitutional infirmity involved because there is no allegation of
intentional discrimination. 5 Cal. 3d at 601, 487 P.2d at 1253, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
The court responded that prior decisions have involved "unintentional" classifications
whose impact simply fell more heavily on the poor. Id. at 602, 487 P.2d at 1253,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 613. See, e.g., Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
The court also rejected the defendants' argument that only de facto discrimination is involved; the school funding scheme is mandated in every detail by the
California Constitution and statutes. See text accompanying notes 14-30 supra. And
even if the financing scheme is merely de facto, the discrimination cannot be justified
by analogy to de facto segregation since the California Supreme Court has ruled that
de facto segregation is invalid. See Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d
876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963).
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indeed. Such an interpretation would require the state to take affirmative action to eliminate differences in the quality of garbage, police, fire
protection and every other local service funded by local property taxes,
which is precisely what Justice Harlan so vigorously protested was not
required by the equal protection clause in his dissenting opinion in
Douglas v. California.24 However, such a reading of Serrano appears
to be overly broad for at least three reasons.
First, the same California Supreme Court forcefully rejected such a
conclusion only five months earlier in Wood v. Public Utilities Com-

mission 15 where customers of Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company and Pacific Gas and Electric Company challenged the validity of
the utility companies' credit policies. Under these rules,12 clearly
drawn on the basis of economic status, only certain customers were required to make initial deposits with the companies before receiving
service. While recognizing that the services supplied by the utilities
were "vital interests,' 12 7 the court rejected the application of the compelling state interest test to determine the validity of the credit rules:
"In the field of economic regulation equal protection ordinarily requires
only that there be a reasonable relationship between the classifications
drawn and the purpose for which they are made."' 28 Here lies the
crux of the problem in applying the compelling interest rule to wealth
classifications: in the absence of a recognized fundamental interest,
the effect of the state's classification inevitably amounts to no more
than economic regulation in which the traditional reasonable relationship test prevails.
Second, if the intent of the court was to establish wealth as a suspect
classification capable of invoking close judicial scrutiny without the
potential forfeiture of a basic right, it was unnecessary to specifically
identify education as a fundamental interest. Such an interpretation
reduces the extensive discussion' 29 of education as a fundamental in124. See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
125. 4 Cal. 3d 288, 481 P.2d 823, 93 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1971).
126. Petitioners specifically took issue with three credit rules which excepted from
the requirement of a deposit or other proof of credit (1) persons owning real property, (2) persons continuously employed by the same employer for two or more years,
and (3) other persons able to establish credit "to the satisfaction" of the company
including private pensioners, employees of large corporations, and professionals. Id.
at 294, 481 P.2d at 826, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
127. Id. at 295, 481 P.2d at 827, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
128. Id. at 294, 481 P.2d at 826, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
129. Over five pages of the court's opinion were devoted to establishing education
as a fundamental interest. See 5 Cal. 3d at 604-10, 487 P.2d at 1255-59, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 615-19.
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terest to the level of dictum. The court's opinion would then have been
complete after the finding of a classification which discriminates on the
basis of wealth.
Third, the court expressly rejected the argument that if the relative
wealth of school districts may not determine the quality of public education, the same reasoning must be applied to all governmental entities in respect to every other tax supported service. The court recognized that it is the uniqueness of education which singles it out among
government services 3 ' and requires the state to "respond to the command of the equal protection clause.''
Thus, it seems logical to conclude that the finding of a fundamental interest is still necessary when
seeking to subject classifications drawn on wealth to the compelling
state interest test.
The Serrano court's apparent willingness to recognize an interest as
fundamental evidences an important expansion of the equal protection
doctrine. The significance of such a designation is demonstrated in
Reynolds v. Sims 2 where state legislative apportionment plans were
declared unconstitutional because they violated the Equal Protection
Clause. Despite the absence of a suspect classification the rationality
of the state's plans was not enough to satisfy the constitutional requirement since the relative value of the fundamental voting right was threatened. Thus, unlike the suspect wealth classification which has always
had the accompanying support of the supposedly alternate fact situation
capable of invoking close scrutiny (fundamental interest), the mere
designation of a right as fundamental was sufficient in itself to require
the showing of a compelling state interest. It therefore follows that
while finding the school financing scheme to be classified on the basis
of wealth is not enough by itself to escape judgment by the traditional
test, the specification of education (or any other interest) as a fundamental right independently invokes the compelling interest rule when
that interest is impaired. In short, the test is an "either/or" criterion
when dealing with a fundamental interest or a racial classification; but
when the suspect classification is wealth the necessity still exists to find
an infringement upon a fundamental interest.
The specification of education as fundamental carries implications
beyond the Serrano decision. It appears that any state imposed clas130. See note 142 infra for those characteristics of education which render it
"unique."

131. 5 Cal. 3d at 614, 487 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
132. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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sification that tends to discriminate between persons by depriving them
of equal educational opportunities must be justified by showing a compelling state interest. In Shapiro v. Thompson'3 3 the United States
Supreme Court found a state law which required a person to live in a
state for at least one year before he qualified for welfare to be unconstitutional. Some families, solely because of the period of time they
lived in the state, were denied welfare assistance. The Court's decision
was based on the statute's violation of the Equal Protection Clause which
prohibits a state not having a compelling justification from impairing a
citizen's fundamental interest in interstate travel.'" 4
Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest. Under this
standard, the waiting-period requirement clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause. 3 5
By juxtaposing the Shapiro and Serrano decisions, it appears that the
California State College tuition provision for non-resident students violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. California requires any "non-resident" student attending a state college to be
charged a minimum of $360 per year tuition, while "resident" students
attending the same state college are to be charged a maximum of $25
per year.13 0 A resident student is defined as "any person who has been
a bona fide resident of the state for more than one year immediately
preceding the residence determination date. 1 3 7 With this definition of
38
the California statute
residency it seems clear that, as in Shapiro,1
creates two classes of residents "indistinguishable from each other except
that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and
...131
the second of residents who have resided less than a year.
And as a result of the Serrano decision declaring education to be fun133. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
134. See note 94 supra.
135. 394 U.S. at 638.
136. Ca.. EDuc. CODE Am. § 23754 (West Supp. 1971) (tuition for nonresident
students) and id. § 23753 (tuition for resident students).
137. Id. § 23756.
138. Chief Justice Warren foresaw such a possibility in his dissenting opinion to
Shapiro:
The Court's decision reveals only the top of the iceberg. Lurking beneath
are the multitude of situations in which States have imposed residence requirements including eligibility to vote, to engage in certain professions or occupations
or to attend a state-supporteduniversity. Although the Court takes pains to avoid
acknowledging the ramifications of its decision, its implications cannot be ignored. 394 U.S. at 655 (emphasis added).
139. 394 U.S. at 627.
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damental, the statute directly affects and impairs a fundamental interest-education.

An argument by the state that its valid interest

in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs justifies the classification would be no more effective than the same argument proved to

be in Shapiro. 40

The only escape from a conclusion of infirmity 41

would be to interpret Serrano as merely designating elementary and secondary education as fundamental, leaving the right to a college education

as perhaps desirable but less than fundamental in nature. 4 '
140. In Shapiro the Court said:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements
determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a
license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements
may promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not
be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel. 394
U.S. at 638 n.21 (emphasis added).
With regard to the assertion that such requirements may not be penalties upon the
exercise of interstate travel see note 141 infra. The Shapiro Court held the state's
interest in its fiscal integrity could not justify its residency requirements for welfare
payments:
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of
its programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures, whether
for public assistance, public education, or any other program. But a state may not
accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens.
Id. at 633.
It would seem that a state could no more claim an interest in preserving its fiscal integrity as a justification for an "invidious discrimination" with respect to the fundamental
interest in education than it can with respect to the fundamental interest in interstate
travel.
141. The California Court of Appeal considered the constitutionality of student
residency requirements in light of the Shapiro decision in Kirk v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970). The court concluded there was no encroachment on
the right to interstate travel when a state imposes residency requirements for education. Id. at 441, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 267. Unlike the residency requirement for welfare
benefits which served to deprive potential recipients of food, clothing, and shelter,
thereby erecting an almost inexorable barrier to interstate travel, the residency requirement prerequisite to lower college tuition fees did not deter any appreciable
number of persons from moving into the state. Id. at 440, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
Since there was no deprivation of a fundamental interest, the court applied the traditional equal protection test and found a rational relationship between the state's residency requirement and its legitimate objective of preserving its fiscal integrity. Id. at
444, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 269. Since Serrano establishes education as a fundamental
interest, it is no longer necessary to demonstrate that the tuition residency requirement deprives individuals of their fundamental interest in interstate travel; merely
showing that the higher tuition fee imposed on residents living in the state for less
than one year serves to deprive certain such residents of their fundamental interest in
education should be sufficient to invoke the compelling state interest test.
142. Such an interpretation may be warranted. One of the factors by which the
court distinguished education from other government furnished services was its compulsory nature "not only in the requirement of attendance but also by assignment to a
particular district and school." 5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
619. On the other hand, Justice Sullivan specified four distinguishing characteristics of
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Equally important as its recognition of education as a fundamental in-

terest is the court's refusal to shut the door to a like argument with respect to other government services. While rejecting the view that there
can be no inequality in any government services, Justice Sullivan refused to express a view as to which particular services might be considered fundamental. Since the designation of a governmental service as a fundamental interest invokes the rather formidable compelling
state interest test, the plaintiff who can convince the court that his particular interest is comparable to the franchise, the right to an education,
or criminal procedural rights will have taken a significant step toward
the invalidation of any law permitting discrimination in the quality
of service furnished. The burden will be on the defendant to demonstrate a state interest compelling the discriminatory classifications.
Therefore, it becomes important to identify those governmental services
which might possibly be considered as fundamental by the California
Supreme Court.
Most judicial considerations of discrimination with respect to government-furnished facilities have been in the context of racial discrimination.14 3 When the racial discrimination is removed from these cases
all that remains is the interest in some minor prerogative. 14" On the
other hand, local government does supply such services as fire protection, police protection and garbage disposal which are more crucial to
education which are equally descriptive of college education as well as elementary and
secondary education: (1) education is essential in maintaining "Free Enterprise Democracy;" (2) education is universally relevant; (3) education continues over a lengthy
period of life; and (4) education is unmatched in the extent to which it molds the
personality of the youth of society. Id. at 609-10, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 618-19.
143. See, e.g., Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (invalidating racial segregation in an amphitheatre in a public park); City of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 922 (1957) (invalidating racial drscrimination at municipal swimming pools); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955), remanded per curiam, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (invalidating racial segregation at municipal golf courses); Dawson v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), affd per curiam, 350 U.S. 877
(1955) (invalidating racial segregation at public beaches); Beal v. Holcombe, 193 F.2d
384 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954) (invalidating racial segregation in public parks); Banks v. Housing Authority of San Francisco, 120 Cal. App.
2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954) (invalidating racial
segregation in public housing).
144. One possible exception is presented in Banks v. Housing Authority of San Francisco, 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954) where the
somewhat more significant interest in low cost housing was involved. The decision
rested entirely upon the racial discrimination and the court failed to discuss the nature of the impaired interest.
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the well-being of the individual. Possibly these services are potential
fundamental interests. The Serrano court attempted to head off this
so called "equal sewer" problem 145 by carefully distinguishing educa-

tion, in terms of its continuing impact upon the populace, from other
47

4 6 But at the same time the court took notice
governmental services.'
of Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Mississippi 48 wherein the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit placed the town of Shaw
under an affirmative duty to equalize such services as street pav-

ing and lighting, sanitation, surface water drainage, water mains and
fire hydrants. While the Hawkins decision was based upon intentional

racial discrimination, the federal district court intimated that wealth
40

discrimination in the provision of city services might also be invalid.'
The wealth allegation, however, was dropped on appeal and the Fifth
0
Arguably, the
Circuit Court never actually ruled on the question.'

California Supreme Court was indicating a willingness to invalidate a taxing system which allows the provision of unequal services of the type
involved in Hawkins. Such a decision is more likely to rest upon a

designation of such services as fundamental rather than the. finding of
a suspect wealth classification.' 5 '
145. See Coons, Chine & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALiF. L. Rav. 305 (1969). These
commentators discuss what they call the "equal sewer problem" saying:
If the equal protection clause eliminates relative wealth as a determinant of the
quality of public education, by what warrant will wealth continue to determine the
quality of other public services? If the distinction between education and all other
services is merely that of sheer importance of the service at stake, shall we prefer
being educated to being alive? Police, firemen, and sewers protect our most
precious possessions, yet the quality of their service, like that of education, is tied
securely to the standard of community affluence. In the years ahead the Court
will be asked repeatedly to remove wealth determinants (and probably other nonegalitarian influences) from all public services. It is possible to imagine such a
result. Id. at 386.
They conclude that education is distinguishable from other public services, using the
same criteria as are used by the California Supreme Court. See note 142 supra.
146. See note 142 supra.
147. 5 Cal. 3d at 614 n.31, 487 P.2d at 1262-63 n.31, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622-23 n.31.
148. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
149. The areas receiving inferior services were predominately inhabited by racial
minorities. These same inhabitants were probably also low income families. Thus,
discrimination was based upon both race and wealth. See id. at 1288.
150. Id. at 1287 n.1.
151. As in Serrano there would probably be a finding of both a suspect wealth
classification and a fundamental interest in the particular service. Again, the
problem would be to determine if the wealth classification or the finding of the
fundamental interest was the controlling factor in invoking the compelling state interest
test. For the reasons discussed above (see text accompanying notes 120-26 supra) it
is more likely that the finding of the fundamental interest would be the controlling
element.
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A related problem is determining the exact limits of the fundamental interest in education. The Serrano decision deals with a policy directly affecting the quality of education, i.e., school district expenditures. There are, however, many government expenditures which indirectly affect the quality of education. For example, it is arguable that
healthy children are better able to learn than unhealthy children and
therefore government expenditures for health clinics affect the fundamental interest in education; and, it can be argued that the state must
equalize the quality of housing if it can be shown children living in
$50,000 houses have a greater opportunity to learn than children living in low cost apartments. Defining the exact limits of the fundamental interest in education is significant because the criteria by
which the court distinguishes education from other governmental services are rather strict.' 52 Thus, while these criteria might bar health care
(or any other governmental service) from fundamental interest characterization, the compelling state interest rule could be invoked if this
service was demonstrated to be a part of the already accepted fundamental interest in education.
With Serrano, the California Supreme Court has enlarged the scope of
the Equal Protection Clause beyond the broad judicial boundaries
established by the United States Supreme Court. The question therefore
remains whether such expansion leaves the California decision vulnerable
to subsequent review in the United States Supreme Court. The California court appeared little bothered by the defendants' assertion that
the United States Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Mclnnis v.
Shapiro,1 53 which sustained a similar school financing plan in Illinois,
foreclosed an independent examination of the issues involved. 154 Justice
Sullivan noted that since Mclnnis reached the Supreme Court by appeal5
1
from a three-judge federal court, review was not discretionary.
While in these circumstances a summary affirmance is formally a decision on the merits, the significance of such summary dispositions is
often unclear where, as in Mclnnis, the Court cites no cases as authority.156 Additionally, Mclnnis was decided on a different issue than that
152. See note 141 supra.
153. 293 F. Supp. 327, aff'd mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322
(1969). See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
154. 5 Cal. 3d at 616, 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
155. Id.

156. The California Supreme Court here relies upon a statement from Currie,
The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHi. L. Rnv. 1, 74
n.365 (1964): "It has often been observed that the dismissal of an appeal, technically an adjudication on the merits, is in practice often the substantial equivalent of a
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presented in Serrano. While the Serrano plaintiffs based their attack
on a "wealth discrimination" theory, 15 7 the Mclnnis court felt the plaintiffs' assertion that "educational needs" were the proper standard for

measuring school financing to be so nebulous as to render the issue nonjusticiable for lack of "discoverable and manageable standards."' 58
Justice Sullivan concluded in Serrano: "In this context, a Supreme Court
affirmance can hardly be considered dispositive of the significant and
complex constitutional questions presented here."'' 5 9
This attempt by the California Supreme Court to devalue the Supreme Courts summary affirmance of Mclnnis appears tangential to
a more basic question. Even if the Mclnnis plaintiffs had framed their

pleadings to allege a wealth discrimination and the United States Supreme Court had affirmed with a written opinion, it would appear that
denial of certiorari." While in Mclnnis the Court affirmed rather than dismissed the
appeal, Currie's statement is nevertheless applicable since, due to historical factors, the
United States Supreme Court will affirm an appeal from a federal court but will dismiss
an appeal from a state court for want of a substantial federal question. 5 Cal. 3d at
616 n.34, 487 P.2d at 1264 n.34, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624 n.34. But see Spano v. Board
of Educ., noted in 40 U.S.L.W. 2475 (Feb. 1, 1972). There, the New York Supreme
Court for Westchester County sustained the New York State system of school financing
through local property taxes against attacks that such a system discriminated on the
basis of wealth and denied plaintiff school children a fundamental interest in education. In so holding, the court felt controlled by the United States Supreme Court's
affirmance of Mclnnis. Deeming Serrano's contrary conclusion a mere rationalization,
the Spano court opined:
To endeavor to extract revelatory, arcane insights from the bare bones of these
two affirmances-with dissents-is to indulge in a form of judicial augury. The
abiding judicial realities are that these very challenges [in Serrano and Spano]
have recently been twice reviewed [in Mclnnis and Burrus v. Wilkerson, 377 U.S.
44 (1970)] and rejected by the Court. It is not within the competence of a nisi
prius state court to presume to explain the Supreme Court's unexpressed thinking;
its conclusions and holdings are sufficient unto themselves. Judicial notice is
taken that the U.S. Supreme Court is quite capable of expounding its views when
so inclined; also, that learned court does not require pronouncements from intermediary surrogates. Id.
157. 5 Cal. 3d at 590 n.1, 487 P.2d at 1244-45 n.1, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604-05 n.1.
158. 293 F. Supp. at 335. The significance of Mclnnis was also questioned by
Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test
for State FinancialStructures, 57 CALiF. L. REv.305, 308-10 (1969):
The meaning of Mclnnis v. Shapiro is ambiguous; but the case hardly seems
another Plessy v. Ferguson. Probably but a temporary setback, it was the predictable consequence of an effort to force the Court to precipitous and decisive
action upon a novel and complex issue for which neither it nor the parties were
ready ...
[TMhe plaintiffs' virtual absence of intelligible theory left the district
court bewildered. Given the pace and character of the litigation, confusion of
court and parties may have been inevitable, foreordaining the summary disposition
of the appeal. The Supreme Court could not have been eager to consider an
issue of this magnitude on such a record. Concededly its per curiam affirmance
is formally a decision on the merits, but it need not imply the Court's permanent
withdrawal from the field. It is probably most significant as an admonition to the
protagonists to clarify the options before again invoking the Court's aid.
159. 5 Cal. 3d at 617, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
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the Serrano decision rests on an adequate and independent state ground.
If so, the United States Supreme Court is lacking in jurisdiction to hear
the case. This basic principle was stated by Justice Jackson in Herb v.
Pitcairn:"6 '
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the principle
that it will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate
and independent state grounds. . . . The reason is so obvious that it
has rarely been thought to warrant statement. It is found in the partitioning of power between the state and federal judicial systems and in
the limitations of our own jurisdiction. . . . [I]f the same judgment

would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory
161

opinion.
The application of this principle is demonstrated in Fox Film Corp. v.
Muller 6 2 where a state court dismissed a contract suit on the grounds
that (1) a concededly invalid arbitration clause in the contract was inseparable from the rest of the agreement and voided the entire contract, and (2) that the contract violated a federal antitrust statute. The
United States Supreme Court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction
due to the existence of adequate and independent state grounds:
[W]here the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of
which is federal and the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction
fails if the non-federal ground is independent of the federal ground and
adequate to support the judgment. 168

In the Serrano opinion, virtually the entire discussion of the plaintiffs' equal protection argument was framed in terms of federal equal
protection. However, it is crucial to note that (1) the plaintiffs also
alleged a violation of the California constitution,164 and (2) the Cali-

fornia Supreme Court specifically stated: "[O]ur analysis of plaintiffs'
federal equal protection contention is also applicable to their claim
under these state constitutionalprovisions".6 5 Since the California constitution is both an independent and adequate state ground supporting

the decision regardless of a possible reversal on the federal constitutional
160. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).

It was unclear to the Court whether the state decision

was based upon a state or federal ground. Thus, the case was continued so as to allow
the parties to obtain a certification from the state court making clear the basis for its
decision.
161. Id. at 125-26.
162. 296 U.S. 207 (1935).
163. Id. at 210.

164. See note 6 supra.
165. 5 Cal. 3d at 596 n.11, 487 P.2d at 1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 n.11
(emphasis added).
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issue, the United States Supreme Court would appear to be lacking in
jurisdiction to review the Serrano decision. Further, if it is unclear to
the federal court whether the Serrano decision rested upon state or federal
grounds, then it is unlikely that the Court would review the federal
issue. 0 6
Serrano has clearly expanded the compelling state interest test. Because the decision seems to rest upon independent and adequate state
grounds, it is unlikely the United States Supreme Court will intervene.
If narrowly interpreted, the decision prohibits the state from financing
public elementary and secondary education by a tax scheme based upon
the valuation of real property within the school district. The broadest
interpretation of Serrano would invalidate any state statute or policy
which either intended to discriminate by classifying individuals according to wealth or touched upon a fundamental interest. Such a broad
interpretation prohibits the state from any form of economic regulation
which treats different groups of people in a dissimilar manner solely because of their economic status. More significantly, it requires affirmative 167 state action to eliminate the economic disparities of its citizens.
In light of the judicial background of the suspect wealth classification as
well as the practical consequences of such a ruling, it is unlikely the
court intends to subject a state statute to the compelling interest test in
the absence of a fundamental interest. However, the California Supreme
Court does indicate a willingness to expand the scope of those interests
which it will consider as fundamental. The designation of education as
such an interest is one indication of this policy. In addition, the court
implied that there exist other governmental services which could be con1 68
sidered fundamental in nature.
Such an interpretation maintains the traditional equal protection
rule with regard to those statutes which are in reality nothing more than
economic regulation. In such a case a rational relationship between the
statute and the state's objective is likely to be sufficient to satisfy the
166. See Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940). There, the Minnesota court had discussed the state as well as the Federal Constitution in invalidating a
tax statute. The Supreme Court found considerable uncertainty concerning the precise
grounds for the decision and thus refused to review the federal question asserted to
be presented. The Court remanded the case so the federal question might be dissected out or the federal questions clearly separated.
167. See text accompanying notes 123-24 supra.

168. This implication arises from both the court's refusal to rule out all other government services as fundamental interests (5 Cal. 3d at 614, 487 P.2d at 1262-63, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 622-23) and its notice (with apparent approval) of Hawkins v. Town of

Shaw, Mississippi, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
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Equal Protection Clause. At the same time it allows the court to recognize new fundamental interests on an ad hoc basis and to subject
state policies affecting these interests to close judicial scrutiny. In those
instances where a wealth classification exists which results in the deprivation or erosion of a fundamental interest, the state must show a compelling interest which justifies its policy.
JamesE. Durbin

